There are connections with the transitory nature of hotels, hospitality industry, and human trafficking. That is why there are so many cases in Florida and all over the country in which hotel chains are sued vicariously because a franchisee of one of their establishments conducted, participated, or just turned a blind eye to routine conduct that constitutes human trafficking on or around the hotel premises. Florida is a huge destination attraction with an extensive amount of hotels, motels, inns, etc. So, logically this is one of the factors that makes FL a hotspot for human trafficking. 
Many times when a hotel is sued in this capacity the Plaintiff/Human Trafficking Victim will allege in the complaint the connections between hotels and human trafficking. However, one of the arguments against this is that these connections are conjecture, merely "puff" and do not add anything substantive to the case at hand in proving the elements of a human trafficking offense. This was the case in S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co. Below is an except from that case.
The Second Amended Complaint contains various allegations regarding sex trafficking in general and its relationship with the hospitality industry, as well as general allegations about the defendants’ knowledge of sex trafficking's prevalence and the failure to prevent it.
S.Y. v. Naples Hotel Co., 476 F. Supp. 3d 1251, 1259 (M.D. Fla. 2020)
C.S. v. Inn Of Naples Hotel, LLC, No. 2:20-CV-629-JES-MRM, 2021 WL 1966432, at *1 (M.D. Fla. May 17, 2021)
The Complaint alleges the following six claims against “each and every Inn of Naples Defendant”: (1) violation of the Trafficking Victims Protection Reauthorization Act of 2008 (TVPRA), 18 U.S.C. § 1595; (2) violation of the Florida RICO statute, § 772.104, Florida Statutes; (3) premise liability; (4) negligent hiring, supervision, and retention; (5) negligent rescue; and (6) aiding and abetting, harboring, confining, coercion, and criminal enterprise. (Id., pp. 29-45.)
Listed above are the common counts that plaintiffs allege when suring a defendant hotel for its participation in human trafficking
S. Y. v. Best W. Int'l, Inc., No. 2:20-CV-616-JES-MRM, 2021 WL 2315073, at *7 (M.D. Fla. June 7, 2021)
In this case the Plaintiff alleged several items ranging in a list from a-k (with subparts) that demonstrated that the Defendant Hotel knew of the routine conduct that took place and therefore the human sex trafficking taking place at the hotel. These items provide specific examples of the type of events and conduct that constitute the knowledge requirement under 18 U.S.C.A. § 1595 (West) which states:
(a) An individual who is a victim of a violation of this chapter may bring a civil action against the perpetrator (or whoever knowingly benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value from participation in a venture which that person knew or should have known has engaged in an act in violation of this chapter) in an appropriate district court of the United States and may recover damages and reasonable attorneys fees.
18 U.S.C.A. § 1595 (West)
Magnifico v. Villanueva, 783 F. Supp. 2d 1217, 1222 (S.D. Fla. 2011)
Labor Trafficking is also a large part of the human trafficking issue in Florida, in this case plaintiffs were falsely promised residency and other misrepresentation for forced labor.
The defendants allegedly recruited the plaintiffs from the Philippines and the United States, using fraudulent visa applications, false promises, and misrepresentations regarding the terms and conditions of employment to induce plaintiffs to work for the defendants in the United States. Plaintiffs allege that defendants forced them to live in severely crowded housing and to work long hours in country clubs and hotels in Florida and New York. To ensure that plaintiffs complied with their demanding work schedule, defendants threatened plaintiffs with arrest, imprisonment, deportation, cancellation of their visas, loss of work, lawsuits, and black-listing.
Second Circuit: United States v. O’Connor, 2008 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 82963 (N.D.N.Y. Oct. 17, 2008), aff’d, 650 F.3d 839 (2d Cir. 2011), cert. denied, 565 U.S. 1148, 132 S. Ct. 1040, 181 L. Ed. 2d 791 (2012).
Fifth Circuit: United States v. Phea, 755 F.3d 255 (5th Cir. 2014); United States v. Anderson, 560 F.3d 275 (5th Cir. 2009).
Seventh Circuit: United States v. Campbell, 770 F.3d 556 (7th Cir. 2014); United States v. Sawyer, 733 F.3d 228 (7th Cir. 2013).
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Koech, 992 F.3d 686 (8th Cir. 2021).
Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176 (11th Cir. 2007); United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281, 1297 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated on sentencing grounds, 544 U.S. 902 (2005), opinion reinstated, 412 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2005).
‘Any person in this state who shall contract with another to perform any labor or service and who shall, by reason of such contract and with the intent to injure and defraud, obtain or procure money or other thing of value as a credit or advances from the person so contracted with and who shall, without just cause, fail or refuse to perform such labor or service or fail or refuse to pay for the money or other thing of value so received upon demand, shall be guilty of a misdemeanor and upon conviction thereof shall be punished by a fine not exceeding five hundred dollars or by imprisonment for a period not exceeding six months.’ Section 1, c. 6528, Acts of 1913 (Comp. Laws 1914, § 3320a).
Goode v. Nelson, 73 Fla. 29, 30, 74 So. 17, 17 (1917)
United States v. Bell, 761 F.3d 900, 907 (8th Cir. 2014)
(a) Whoever knowingly—
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1) knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act ... shall be punished....
The term “coercion” is defined at 18 U.S.C. § 1591(e)(2).
See United States v. Roberts, 174 Fed. Appx. 475, 478–79 (11th Cir. 2006) (sufficient evidence that defendant’s activities were “in or affecting interstate commerce” based upon defendant’s use of a credit card to pay for his trip with the travel agency, his decision to meet the prostitutes at a hotel that served interstate travelers, and the fact that the prostitutes were supposed to move in international commerce).
See United States v. Strevell, 185 Fed. Appx. 841, 845 (11th Cir. 2006) (sufficient evidence that defendant’s activities were “in or affecting interstate and foreign commerce” based upon defendant’s use of two means of interstate commerce in attempting to obtain and entice a minor for sex: “[h]e made numerous phone calls from Philadelphia to Miami to order to arrange his sexual encounter in Costa Rica [and] … he attempted to board a plane from Miami to Costa Rica in order to meet one, if not two, 14-year-old prostitutes.”).
See United States v. Evans, 476 F.3d 1176, 1179 (11th Cir. 2007) (the defendant’s “conduct substantially affected interstate commerce” based on his “use of hotels that served interstate travelers and distribution of condoms that traveled in interstate commerce”).
Miles v. State, 324 So. 3d 1027, 1028 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)
This case does not provide a lot of analysis on the substantive aspects of winning a human trafficking case, however it shows how important age is when brining a claim under § 787.06(3)(g), Fla. Stat. (2016) and how a hearsay objection can put the justice for a trafficked victim at risk.
J.D.’s age was an essential element of the charged offense. See § 787.06(3)(g), Fla. Stat. (2016). The jury was not given the option to convict Miles of any lesser offenses. Without the challenged testimony, there would not have been any evidence on the age of the victim, which would have led to either a judgment of acquittal or not guilty verdict. Because the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the trial court's error did not contribute to Miles's conviction, we reverse and remand for a new trial
Miles v. State, 324 So. 3d 1027, 1029 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2021)
United States v. Mozie, 752 F.3d 1271, 1281 (11th Cir. 2014)
In this difficult to read case, a Florida man is sentenced to life in prison after running a sex trafficking ring out of his home. Several underage girls brought suit under the child sex trafficking statute listed below. The defendant in this case challenged the statute as facially unconstitutional in that it violates the Due Process Clause of the Constitution, but this challenge failed.
The child sex trafficking statute provides in relevant part:
(a) Whoever knowingly—
(1) in or affecting interstate or foreign commerce, or within the special maritime and territorial jurisdiction of the United States, recruits, entices, harbors, transports, provides, obtains, or maintains by any means a person; or
(2) benefits, financially or by receiving anything of value, from participation in a venture which has engaged in an act described in violation of paragraph (1),
knowing, or in reckless disregard of the fact, that means of force, threats of force, fraud, coercion described in subsection (e)(2), or any combination of such means will be used to cause the person to engage in a commercial sex act, or that the [victim] has not attained the age of 18 years and will be caused to engage in a commercial sex act, shall be punished as provided in subsection (b).
....
(c) In a prosecution under subsection (a)(1) in which the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to observe the [victim] so recruited, enticed, harbored, transported, provided, obtained or maintained, the Government need not prove that the defendant knew that the person had not attained the age of 18 years.
18 U.S.C. § 1591 (emphasis added).
United States Supreme Court: United States v. Kozminski, 487 U.S. 931, 108 S. Ct. 2751, 101 L. Ed. 2d 788 (1988).
First Circuit: United States v. Alzanki, 54 F.3d 994 (1st Cir. 1995).
Fourth Circuit: United States v. Udeozor, 515 F.3d 260 (4th Cir. 2008).
Eighth Circuit: United States v. Farrell, 563 F.3d 364 (8th Cir. 2009).
Ninth Circuit: United States v. Veerapol, 312 F.3d 1128 (9th Cir. 2002).
Tenth Circuit: United States v. Kaufman, 546 F.3d 1242 (10th Cir. 2008).
Eleventh Circuit: United States v. Pipkins, 378 F.3d 1281 (11th Cir. 2004), vacated on sentencing grounds, 544 U.S. 902 (2005), opinion reinstated, 412 F.3d 1251 (11th Cir. 2005); Eleventh Circuit Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions, Offense Instruction 59.
