Harrison, Mardi: American Law Reports

The United States Supreme Court in Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 547 (2012), held that mandatory sentences of life without parole for individuals who committed homicide offenses when they were juveniles violate the Eighth Amendment. The Court did not foreclose life without parole for juvenile homicide offenders but required the sentencer to consider how children are different and how those differences counsel against irrevocably sentencing them to a lifetime of prison. Miller applies retroactively to cases that were pending on direct review when Miller was decided, but it is not clear whether Miller applies retroactively on collateral review with respect to cases that were final prior to Miller. The Supreme Court of Louisiana in State v. Tate, 130 So. 3d 829, 102 A.L.R.6th 865 (La. 2013), relying on the federal Teague doctrine, held that Miller is not retroactively applicable to cases on collateral review, finding that Miller sets forth a new rule of criminal procedure which is neither substantive nor a watershed procedural rule implicating fundamental fairness and accuracy of criminal proceedings. This annotation collects and analyzes the cases considering the retroactive application of Miller in postconviction proceeding.

Excerpt from Westlaw

The Eighth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution, U.S. Const. Amend. VIII, prohibits cruel and unusual punishment, guaranteeing individuals the right not to be subjected to excessive sanctions. In Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407, 78 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 547 (2012), the U.S. Supreme Court held that the Punishment Clause bars a mandatory sentence of life imprisonment without the possibility of parole for minors who are under the age of 18 when their crimes are committed, as applied to two offenders who were 14 years old when convicted of murder. The Court further stated that the Punishment Clause requires the sentencer to consider the characteristics of minors as offenders and how minors are different in recognition that minors are less deserving of the most severe punishments because they have diminished culpability and greater prospects for reform. The Court added that the distinctive attributes of youth diminish the penological justifications for imposing the harshest sentences on juvenile offenders, even when they commit terrible crimes, given that minors' lack of maturity and a developed sense of responsibility lead to recklessness, impulsivity, and heedless risk-taking, minors are more vulnerable to negative influences and outside pressures, and the character of minors is not as well formed as the character of an adult.

Excerpt from Westlaw