Rinzler v. Carson, 262 So. 2d 661 (Fla. 1972)
"Owner brought replevin action against sheriff seeking return of submachine gun which sheriff had seized. The Circuit Court for Duval County, Charles Cook Howell, Jr., J., rendered summary judgment in favor of the sheriff and the owner appealed. The Supreme Court, Mason, Circuit Judge, held that statute making it unlawful for any person to own or to have in his care, custody, possession or control any short-barreled rifle, short-barreled shotgun or machine gun which is or may readily be made operable did not infringe owner's right to keep and bear arms, but that where submachine gun had been registered under National Firearms Act at time of its seizure, it was within exception to the statute."
"In summary we hold
(1) That Section 790.221, Florida Statutes, F.S.A., is constitutional;
(2) The same does not make the possession of the weapon in question by the appellant unlawful for the reason that he owns and possessed it under provisions of federal law, and
(3) Jacksonville City Ordinance, Section 26-69, does not have the effect of prohibiting the appellant's right in and to said weapon because it conflicts with an express exception of Section 790.221, Florida Statutes, F.S.A.
The summary final judgment is reversed and the cause remanded for further proceedings not inconsistent herewith."
Kitchen v. K-Mart Corp., 697 So. 2d 1200 (Fla. 1997)
"Woman who was shot by her intoxicated ex-boyfriend sued store for negligence in selling firearm to boyfriend while he was intoxicated. The Circuit Court, Palm Beach County, Lucy Brown, J., awarded woman $12,580,768 in damages. Store appealed, and the District Court of Appeal, Klein, J., 662 So.2d 977, reversed and remanded and certified question. The Supreme Court, Anstead, J., held that: (1) statutes criminalizing sale of weapon to person not of sound mind or use of weapon by intoxicated person did not bar claim, and (2) seller of firearm to buyer who is known to be intoxicated may be held liable by third person injured through intoxicated buyer's use of firearm under theory of negligent entrustment."
"We have for review a decision ruling upon the following question certified to be of great public importance:
CAN A SELLER OF A FIREARM TO A PURCHASER KNOWN TO THE SELLER TO BE INTOXICATED BE HELD LIABLE TO A THIRD PERSON INJURED BY THE PURCHASER?
See K-Mart Corp. v. Kitchen, 662 So.2d 977, 979 (Fla. 4th DCA 1995). We have jurisdiction. Art. V, § 3(b)(4), Fla. Const. For the reasons expressed below, we answer the question in the affirmative."
Smith v. State ex rel. Osborne, 121 Fla. 241, 163 So. 524 (1935)
"Proceeding in mandamus by the State, at the relation of Charles Z. Osborne and others, against J. M. Smith and others, as County Commissioners of Marion County. To review a judgment awarding a peremptory writ of mandamus, the respondents bring error."
"The only question presented here was whether or not where a person over 21 years of age, of good moral character, applies to the board of county commissioners for a license to carry a firearm such as is contemplated under section 5101, R. G. S., section 7203, C. G. L., and it does not appear that the person applying for such license intends to use the firearm for which such license is to apply for an unlawful purpose, it thereupon becomes the duty of the board of county commissioners to issue the license when the terms of the statute have been complied with and it does not appear that it is the purpose of the applicant **526 to use the firearms described in his application for unlawful purposes.
"Juvenile being tried on weapons charge moved to suppress evidence. The Circuit Court of Dade County, Steve Levine, J., granted motion, and state appealed. The District Court of Appeal, 689 So.2d 1116, Fletcher, J., ruled that police officers were justified in conducting Terry stop, in order to determine whether juvenile was carrying concealed weapon, and juvenile petitioned for review. The Supreme Court held that: (1) no firearm or weapons exception to constitutional limitations on searches and seizures would be created, and (2) anonymous tip was insufficient to justify a Terry stop, absent indication that police independently observed suspicious or illegal conduct."
"The question presented in this case is whether an anonymous tip that a person is carrying a gun is, without more, sufficient to justify a police officer's stop and frisk of that person. We hold that it is not."
Taurus Holdings, Inc. v. U.S. Fid. & Guar. Co., 913 So. 2d 528 (Fla. 2005)
"Municipalities brought actions against gun manufacturer, alleging negligence, negligent supervision, negligent marketing, negligent distribution, negligent advertising, negligent entrustment, public and private nuisance, failure to warn, false advertising, and unfair and deceptive trade practices, and seeking compensation for expenses incurred for, among other things, police protection, hospital costs, emergency medical services, and prosecution of violent crimes involving the use of handguns. Gun manufacturer sought coverage from commercial general liability insurers for defense and indemnity for any ultimate damages, while insurers asserted that the products-completed operations hazard exclusion applied. The United States District Court, Southern District of Florida, Adalberto Jordan, J., entered judgment for insurers, and gun manufacturer appealed. The Court of Appeals, 11th Circuit, 367 F.3d 1252, certified question to the Supreme Court of Florida."
"In this case we must decide whether commercial liability insurance policies exclude coverage for lawsuits that several municipalities have filed against a gun manufacturer. The municipalities seek to recover the cost of medical and other services incurred as a result of gun violence in their communities. The issue is whether the damages "arise out of" the use of guns, and are thus excluded from coverage under the policies' products-completed operations hazard exclusions. As we explain below, we hold that the broad language in the policies excluding from coverage "all bodily injury and property damage occurring away from premises you own or rent and arising out of your product" excludes coverage for these lawsuits."
First District
Colvin v. State, 445 So. 2d 657 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1984)
"Defendant was convicted before the Circuit Court, Leon County, J. Lewis Hall, Jr., J., of five counts of grand theft, and he appealed. The District Court of Appeal held that multiple units of prosecution were permissible under theft statute where several firearms were taken from their respective owners at different times and places, and defendant who had no part in the original takings was convicted based upon his purchase of the firearms with knowledge of their stolen character from the same person on several different occasions."
"The question for resolution is one of proper interpretation of the theft statute, Section 812.014, Florida Statutes (1981), as applied to one who is charged with theft of multiple firearms under the above circumstances."
Williams v. State, 402 So. 2d 78 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1981)
"Defendant appealed from order of the Circuit Court, Leon County, Charles Miner, J., adjudicating him guilty of possession of firearm by convicted felon. The District Court of Appeal, Joanos, J., held that defendant had not had his “civil rights” restored for purposes of statute governing crime of possession of firearm by convicted felon at time of the alleged unlawful possession."
"We reject appellant's arguments and agree with the State. What appellant actually received was a partial restoration of his civil rights rather than a complete restoration. When the appellant was convicted of a felony, one of the rights that he previously held as a citizen, the right to possess a firearm, was taken away by virtue of § 790.23(1). Appellant could no longer legally possess or own a firearm. This was clearly a "civil right" that he no longer possessed. Under the Governor's discretionary clemency power (Article IV, § 8, Florida Constitution) appellant was restored to all other pre-conviction rights except the authority to possess or own a firearm. The trial court properly denied the motion to dismiss because appellant had not had his "civil rights" restored for purposes of § 790.23 when the event for which he was charged occurred."
Pelt v. State, Dep't of Transp., 664 So. 2d 320 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
"Employee of Department of Transportation (DOT) appealed order of Public Employees Relations Commission adopting findings of hearing officer and concluding that employee was properly suspended for five days for carrying unauthorized firearm. The District Court of Appeal, Wentworth, Senior Judge, held that employee was properly suspended."
Doyle v. Florida Dep't of State, Div. of Licensing, 748 So. 2d 353 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1999)
"Applicant appealed denial by the Department of State, Division of Licensing, of his application for concealed weapon or firearm permit. The District Court of Appeal, Ervin, J., held that: (1) misdemeanor conviction from another state that would have been felony in state did not preclude concealed weapon permit, and (2) Division lacks authority to deny permits to applicants whose civil rights remain intact.
"Appellant, Michael W. Doyle, appeals the denial of his application for a concealed weapon or firearm permit. Appellee, the Florida Department of State, Division of Licensing (Division), ruled that because Doyle had been convicted of a misdemeanor in New York that would have been a felony if committed in Florida, under Article X, Section 10 of the Florida Constitution,[1] he was not entitled to the permit pursuant to section 790.06(2)(d)[2] and section 790.23(1)(a),[3] Florida Statutes (1997). We cannot agree with the Division's reasoning, and reverse and remand with directions."
Second District
State v. Grappin, 427 So. 2d 760 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1983) approved, 450 So. 2d 480 (Fla. 1984)
"State appealed from an order of the Circuit Court, Pinellas County, Thoma E. Penick, Jr., J., granting defendant's motion to dismiss five-count information alleging that defendant committed five thefts of the second degree by stealing five firearms during the same transaction. The District Court of Appeal, Hobson, J., held that simultaneous unlawful taking of more than one firearm is subject to separate prosecution and punishment under theft statute as to each firearm so taken."
"This is a petition to review a decision of the Second District Court of Appeal reported as State v. Grappin, 427 So.2d 760 (Fla. 2d DCA 1983), in which the district court held that the unlawful taking of two or more firearms during the same criminal episode is subject to separate prosecution and punishment under the theft statute as to each firearm taken. We find direct conflict with Thomas v. State, 405 So.2d 1015 (Fla. 1st DCA 1981); Drakes v. State, 400 So.2d 487 (Fla. 5th DCA), review denied, 411So.2d 381 (Fla. 1981); and Joiner v. State, 382 So.2d 1357 (Fla. 1st DCA), review denied, 388 So.2d 1114 (Fla. 1980). We have jurisdiction, article V, section 3(b)(3), Florida Constitution, and we approve the decision of the district court."
Luby v. State, 648 So. 2d 308 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1995)
"Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Pasco County, Stanley R. Mills, J., of battery on a police officer, resisting arrest with violence, and battery. Defendant appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Parker, J., held that: (1) condition of probation which prohibited defendant from possessing, carrying or owning weapons or firearms without first securing consent of his probation officer would be stricken; (2) condition of probation ordering defendant to pay one dollar per month to certain organization would be stricken; and (3) words “at your own expense” would be stricken from condition of probation requiring defendant to submit to random alcohol and drug testing at his own expense."
" We affirm the judgment and sentences; however, our review of the record discloses that Conditions 4 and 9 of probation must be stricken . . ."
"Condition 4 prohibits Luby from possessing, carrying or owning any weapons or firearms without first securing the consent of his probation officer. This court has held that condition implies that the defendant may possess a firearm with his probation officer's permission and must be stricken because, as a convicted felon, the defendant may not lawfully possess a firearm. See Pagan v. State, 637 So.2d 959 (Fla. 2d DCA 1994); Crawford v. State, 616 So.2d 1158 (Fla. 2d DCA 1993). See also Grate v. State, 623 So.2d 591 (Fla. 5th DCA 1993) (upholding the condition that the defendant not possess firearms but striking that portion which delegates the authority to approve possession by the probation officer)."
State v. Menuto, 912 So. 2d 603 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2005)
"Defendant charged with illegal possession of firearms by ex-juvenile offender moved to dismiss information. The Circuit Court, Pinellas County, Brandt C. Downey, III, J., granted motion, and state appealed."
"When the trial court dismissed the information against Mathew Sabastian Menuto, it held that section 790.23(1)(b), Florida Statutes (2002), was unconstitutional. We agree with the State that the statute withstands Menuto's constitutional challenges, and we reverse."
Third District
Sogo v. Garcia's Nat. Gun, Inc., 615 So. 2d 184 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993)
"Mother of handgun buyer who used gun to commit suicide brought action against seller, alleging negligence. The Circuit Court, Dade County, Sidney B. Shapiro, J., entered summary judgment for seller, and mother appealed. The District Court of Appeal held that: (1) complaint sufficiently alleged causal relationship between seller's negligence in selling gun in violation of three-day waiting period imposed by ordinance and buyer's subsequent use of gun to commit suicide, as buyer's act of shooting himself was, by virtue of ordinance, foreseeable intervening cause; (2) buyer was member of class intended to be protected by ordinance; (3) complaint did not fail to state cause of action by failing to plead that no exemption to ordinance applied to transaction; but (4) seller's alleged violation of ordinance did not create strict liability."
"For the reasons stated, we conclude that plaintiff's amended complaint stated a cause of action for negligence based on violation of the waiting period ordinance. In the trial court the plaintiff also alleged a violation of section 21-20.14 of the Metropolitan Dade County Code, which prohibits sale or delivery of firearms to certain classes of persons. Plaintiff alleged no facts showing that the decedent fell into any of the categories enumerated by section 21-20.14, and on this appeal, plaintiff does not challenge that aspect of the order of dismissal."
Nra of Am. v. City of S. Miami, 812 So. 2d 504 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 3d Dist. 2002)
"The National Rifle Association and others have appealed the trial court's summary judgment, in favor of the City of South Miami, concluding that this action for declaratory judgment is not ripe for determination. Involved is City of South Miami ordinance 14-00-1716, regulating firearms by establishing certain safety standards therefor. The declaration the appellants are seeking includes a determination that the City's ordinance is ultra vires because the legislature expressly preempted the entire field of firearm and ammunition regulation by enactment of section 790.33, Florida Statutes (2000)."
Fourth District
Darman v. State, 774 So. 2d 798 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2000)
"Individual whose personal property was seized by state filed motion for return of his property. The Circuit Court, Broward County,Victor Tobin, J., denied motion as being untimely, and individual appealed. The District Court of Appeal, 734 So.2d 552, affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded. On remand, the Circuit Court determined that individual was not legal owner of property. Individual appealed. The District Court of Appeal, Warner, C.J., held that: (1) evidence was sufficient to find that police department was the legal owner of property seized, and (2) individual was not entitled to property on basis of statute providing for return of seized weapons for offenses involving use or attempted use of firearm."
"This is the second time this case involving appellant's claim to a firearm seized by the police has been before us. In Darman v. State, 734 So.2d 552 (Fla. 4th DCA 1999) ("Darman I"), we reversed the trial court's determination that the motion for return of property was untimely and directed the trial court to hold a hearing on the motion. The trial court subsequently determined that the legal owner of the firearm was the Windsor, Connecticut Police Department and not appellant. It therefore ordered the gun to be returned to the police department. Because the order is supported by competent substantial evidence, we affirm."
L.S., a Child, Appellant, v. State of Florida, Appellee. 2013 WL 3811672 --- So.3d ----
"L.S. appeals adjudications for carrying a concealed firearm, grand theft of a firearm, improper exhibition of a firearm, resisting arrest without violence, and possession of a firearm by a minor. He claims that the trial court erred in denying his motion for judgment of dismissal on the grand theft charge, because the state failed to prove appellant stole the firearm in question. As we conclude that the state relied solely on the presumption of possession of recently stolen property to establish the crime, and the property was not recently stolen, we reverse his adjudication for grand theft. We affirm his adjudication for carrying a concealed firearm, rejecting his claim that section 790.22(3), Florida Statutes (2011), restricting the right of minors to carry firearms, is unconstitutional."
Fifth District
Brook v. State, 999 So. 2d 1093 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009)
"Defendant was convicted in the Circuit Court, Orange County, Alicia Latimore, J., of carrying a concealed firearm after he pled nolo contendere. Defendant appealed."
"We are bound by the clear wording of the statute. The defendant's conduct fell within the ambit of the exemption contained in subsection 790.25(3)(n) and accordingly, the motion to dismiss should have been granted. We reverse and remand for entry of an order of discharge."
State v. Ragland, 789 So. 2d 530 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 5th Dist. 2001)
"The state appeals the dismissal of an information filed against William Ragland. We affirm.
Ragland, a student at Brevard County Community College ("BCC"), was arrested after campus security allegedly discovered in his vehicle a securely encased, unloaded 30.6 Browning Bolt Action Rifle, along with a box of ammunition."
"Miami-Dade County and its Mayor, Alexander Penelas, [together "County"], filed a complaint against twenty-six federally licensed firearms manufacturers, three firearms trade associations, and two firearms retail dealers, alleging various theories, including negligence, strict liability for defective products, public nuisance, and ultra hazardous activity, in an effort to recover the County's costs of responding to firearms incidents. The County's complaint also seeks injunctive relief requiring manufacturers to implement life-saving features into their products, and to alter the method of firearm distribution and sale so as to better keep firearms out of criminal circulation. We affirm the trial court's dismissal of the County's action with prejudice."
