•Non Florida CASES SPECIFIC TO NURSING TESTIMONY ADMISSIBILITY
•Registered nurse (RN) was qualified to testify, in deceased patient's estate's Adult Protective Services Act (APSA) action against long-term acute care (LTAC) facility, about the standard of care applicable to any licensed practical nurse (LPN) or certified nurseassistant (CNA) who was involved in patient's care; RN had extensive experience and had spent the majority of her professional time during the relevant period teaching nurses at a college of nursing. A.R.S. § 12–2604. Cornerstone Hosp. of Southeast Arizona, L.L.C. v. Marner ex rel. County of Pima, 290 P.3d 460 (Ariz. Ct. App. Div. 2 2012).
•Nurse demonstrated that she had some degree of "specialized knowledge, skill, experience, training and education" in the field in which she sought to render an expert opinion and thus, was qualified to render an expert opinion in regard to estate's ordinary negligence claim against a nursing home that related to resident's fall in home; nurse attested that she was a registered nurseand licensed nursing-home administrator for past 25 years, was familiar with standards of care of her profession, and stated that home's negligence in its departure from the standards of care proximately caused harm and injury to resident. Rules of Evid., Rule 601(D). Brannon v. Austinburg Rehab. & Nursing Ctr., 2010-Ohio-5396, 943 N.E.2d 1062 (Ohio Ct. App. 11th Dist. Ashtabula County 2010).
•Nurse proffered by patient's estate was qualified to serve as an expert in medical malpractice action against hospital involving the failure of emergency room (ER) nurses to triage patient with emergent patient status; nurse's deposition testimony generally described her nursing experience, her affidavit supplemented the testimony with greater detail as to the dates of her experience, and the full evidence reflected that nurse had actual professional knowledge and experience in the relevant areas of nursing as a result of having been regularly engaged in the active practice of critical care and ER nursing for three of the five years preceding the incident at issue. West's Ga.Code Ann. §§ 24–9–67.1(b), 51–1–27. Knight v. Roberts, 730 S.E.2d 78 (Ga. Ct. App. 2012).
•The trial court abused its discretion when it determined that nurse was not qualified to offer expert testimony, in malpractice case filed against nurse after patient fell and broke her hip after being weighed in doctor's office; the area of specialty at issue in malpractice case was managing patient safety while moving or directing patients, and nurse worked as a nurse in a clinical setting, managing patient safety both prior to and after surgery, for at least three of the five years prior to patient's fall, and she managed patient safety with sufficient frequency during that time frame to establish an appropriate level of knowledge for managing patient's safety while she was being weighed. West's Ga.Code Ann. § 24–9–67.1(c), (c)(2)(A). Anderson v. Mountain Management Services, Inc., 306 Ga. App. 412, 702 S.E.2d 462 (2010).
•The trial court erred in allowing a nurse to testify in a medical malpractice about her observation of the amount of force that defendant employed in performing an intubation because the observation was an opinion and the nurse, testifying as a layperson, was not qualified to render such an opinion without the proper foundation. The error was not so prejudicial as to require reversal however because the nurse testified that she had seen quite a number of intubations during her career and that she directly assisted defendant in the instant case, thus establishing some foundation for her opinion evidence. Additionally the nurseadmitted that her assessment of what amounted to undue force could not be made accurately and this admission alleviated any prejudice that might have accrued. Burns v Michelotti (1992, 2d Dist) 237 Ill App 3d 923, 178 Ill Dec 621, 604 NE2d 1144.
•Nurse practitioner was qualified to testify as an expert concerning her interpretation of x-ray evidence in medical malpractice action against hospital to recover damages resulting when a surgical sponge was left in patient's abdomen following surgery; nurse was highly trained with approximately forty years of nursing experience, nurse held a Ph.D. in health organization research, nurse was a professor of nursing at university, nurse had specialized training in analyzing x-rays for the presence of foreign metal, and sponge at issue had a metal tag attached to it for the precise purpose of allowing it to be located on an x-ray. Rules of Evid., Rule 702. Savage v. Three Rivers Medical Center, 390 S.W.3d 104 (Ky. 2012).
•Doctor was sufficiently qualified to testify in medical negligence action regarding standard of care expected of nurses in emergency treatment of child who suffered seizure at hospital and died; doctor was a board-certified pediatrician, he regularly treated children in emergency situations, and he spent the bulk of his work life in a hospital-based work environment, which included the supervision of nurses. Rules of Evid., Rules 702. Tapp v. Owensboro Medical Health System, Inc., 282 S.W.3d 336 (Ky. Ct. App. 2009).
•Nurse practitioner was not qualified to testify as an expert regarding standard of care, for purposes of statute requiring plaintiffs bringing actions for medical injury to disclose an expert capable of testifying as to the standard of reasonable professional practice, breach of that standard, and proximate cause, in action by patient and her husband against hospital for false imprisonment, negligence, and loss of consortium, relating to hospital's refusal to release patient from lockdown in its in-patient detoxification facility; nurse practitioner's statement that she would testify that in her opinion the hospital should have released patient from the facility because patient strongly desired to leave was bereft of admissible evidence of the standard of care, i.e., the proper protocols for discharge of patients from inpatient detoxification facilities. RSA 507–E:2(1). Smith v. HCA Health Services of New hampshire, Inc., 977 A.2d 534 (N.H. 2009).
•In a wrongful death action based upon defendant orthopedic surgeon's alleged negligent supervision of a nurse anesthetist during surgery, an expert in nurse anesthesia was competent to testify that (1) the nurse anesthetist needed supervision in ascertaining that there was a medical crisis and in deciding what remedial measures should be taken, and (2) the surgeon had a duty to provide such supervision where the witness testified that, in her fifteen years of practice as a nurse anesthetist, she had participated in thousands of operations since the witness was as knowledgeable as surgeons about what a nurse anesthetist can competently do without supervision. Furthermore, the exclusion of this testimony was prejudicial error where the jury returned a verdict in favor of defendant surgeon, this witness was the only one who offered to testify that the anesthetist needed defendant's supervision in a medical emergency and was incapable of making the proper decisions without help, and the admission of this testimony could have altered the jury's verdict. Harris v Miller (1994) 335 NC 379, 438 SE2d 731.
•Exception allowing an expert who is not a similarly situated health-care provider to offer testimony about standard of care alleged to have been breached in a medical malpractice case, if she or he is highly qualified, did not apply to allow registered nurse to testify that nurses in cardiac-recovery unit breached standard of care to prevent development of patient's pressure ulcers while recovering from cardiac-artery-bypass graft (CABG) surgery; while nurse was highly qualified with regard to general wound-care treatment and prevention of pressure ulcers, it was not shown that he was highly qualified with regard to prevention of pressure ulcers in post-CABG patients who were in a cardiac-recovery units. Code 1975, § 6–5–548(b)(2). Springhill Hospitals, Inc. v. Critopoulos, 87 So. 3d 1178 (Ala. 2011).
