LibGuides: Child Abuse and Neglect: Legal Encyclopedias

Florida Jurisprudence

Child Abuse, Abandonment, or Neglect

Generally, Famlaw § 98-108

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Aggravated child abuse

Generally, Famlaw § 224-226

Included offenses, Famlaw § 226

Kidnapping, reclassification of offense, Crimsub § 766

Willful torture or malicious punishment, Famlaw § 225

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Child protection teams, protective investigations, Famlaw § 108

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Definitions

Abandon, Famlaw § 99

Abandonment, Famlaw § 99

Abuse, Famlaw § 99

Neglect, Famlaw § 99

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Guardian ad litem for abused or neglected child, appointment of, Famlaw § 100

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Protective custody, taking child into, Famlaw § 101

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American Jurisprudence

Infants

Protection, Power of State, Protection from Abuse or Danger to Health or Morals

Generally, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 15

Constitutional Issues, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 16

Availability of Private Cause of Action for Violation, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 17

Criminalized Activities

Generally, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 18

Constitutionality, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 19

Retroactive Effect, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 20

Failure to Provide Medical Attention

Generally, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 21

Evidence, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 22

Provision of Treatment by State, 42 Am Jur 2d Infants § 23

Out-of-Home Care by state and Place: Higher Placement rates for Children in some remote rural Places

American Law Reports

Physical abuse of child by parent as ground for termination of parent's right to child

53 A.L.R.3d 605

"Parents have an inherent right to control and care for their children, and this right will not be disturbed except for the strongest reasons and upon a clear showing of gross misconduct or unfitness, or of other extraordinary circumstances affecting the welfare of the children. As might be expected, immoderate and unreasonably cruel physical punishment of a child generally has been considered to be grounds upon which a judicial body may base the termination of parental rights.

A few parents deprived of their children on the basis of evidence of physical abuse have challenged the action of the courts on constitutional grounds. The issues most frequently raised in this context have been procedural. However, in one case within the scope of this annotation, the parents' claims that a statutory provision describing children who should be removed from their homes was unconstitutionally vague, and that an absolute constitutional right to control one's own children existed, was rejected by the court.

Since courts have been extremely reluctant to remove children from parental control except upon the most convincing proof of necessity, parents who have been deprived of the right to their children by reason of their infliction of physical abuse, most frequently have attempted to rely upon allegations of insufficiency of evidence to obtain reversals and reobtain custody. No inflexible rules have been set for deciding what constitutes parental unfitness sufficient to warrant removal of the child from the home, and each of these cases has been decided on the basis of its own facts."

Validity, Construction, and Application of § 237(a)(2)(E) of Immigration and Nationality Act (8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(E)), Providing for Removal of Alien for Domestic Violence, Stalking, Child Abuse, Neglect or Abandonment, or Violation of Protection Order

40 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 27

"An alien may be removed from the United States under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(i) as a result of a conviction for a crime of domestic violence, stalking, or child abuse, neglect, or abandonment, and may be removed under 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii) for the violation of certain domestic protection orders. In Alanis-Alvarado v. Holder, 558 F.3d 833, 40 A.L.R. Fed. 2d 639 (9th Cir. 2009), the court held that an alien's convictions for violating a state statute prohibiting any intentional and knowing violation of a protective order categorically qualified as convictions of "violating a protective order" for purposes of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(E)(ii), which defines a protective order as any injunction issued for the purpose of preventing violent or threatening acts of domestic violence, and thus, the alien's convictions were removable offenses. This annotation collects and analyzes federal and state court cases, and selected administrative opinions, that have construed, applied, or determined the validity of 8 U.S.C.A. § 1227(a)(2)(E)."

Corpus Juris Secundum

Children and Minors

Abuse & Cruelty, Generally, 43 C.J.S. Infants § 115

"While there is authority that a determination in a dependency case requires only proof by a preponderance of the evidence,1 there is authority that a finding of dependency must be based on clear and convincing evidence.2 "Clear and convincing evidence" in a dependency proceeding has been defined as testimony that is so clear, direct, weighty, and convincing as to enable the trier of facts to come to a clear conviction, without hesitancy, of the truth of the precise facts in issue.3

A finding of neglect4 or abuse5 in a civil child protective proceeding need only be supported by a preponderance of the evidence.In a petition for adjudication of wardship under a statute, the State must prove its allegation of neglect or abuse by a preponderance of the evidence.6 It is the State's burden to prove that a child is a child in need of care and supervision by a preponderance of the evidence.7"

Duty to Report Abuse, 43 C.J.S. Infants § 116

"Before a natural parent may be permanently deprived of the right to care, custody, and control of a child, the facts supporting the permanent deprivation must clearly show that the welfare of the child will be substantially subserved by such an action.1

More than a mere preponderance of the evidence is required to support an order permanently depriving a parent of a child,2 and the ultimate fact in issue must be shown by the evidence to be highly probable.3 In a parental rights termination proceeding, the private interest affected weighs heavily against the use of the preponderance of the evidence standard,4 and a standard of proof more strict than the fair preponderance of the evidence is consistent with two state interests at stake in parental rights termination proceedings: the parens patriae interest in preserving and promoting the welfare of the child and a fiscal and administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such proceedings.5 Thus, it has been variously stated that in order to support an order permanently depriving parents of the custody of their infant children, the findings of fact must be supported by substantial evidence6 or must be clear and convincing7 or clear, cogent, and convincing.8"

Duty to Report Child Abuse - Liability and Immunity Therefrom, 43 C.J.S. Infants § 117

"While a judicial admission of the charge of an offense, standing alone, may be sufficient to establish the court's jurisdiction,1 a juvenile's confession or admission made out of court is insufficient to support an adjudication of delinquency unless it is corroborated in whole or in part by other evidence2 and where the only evidence of intent to commit a felony is the juvenile's improperly admitted confession.3

The delinquency of a juvenile may not be established by his incriminating statements in the absence of proof of the corpus delicti.4Proof of the corpus delicti may be established by considering the juvenile's confession, as well as the corroborating evidence.5

There is authority that when the admissibility of an alleged confession, admission, or incriminating statement of a juvenile is at issue, it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that the confession, admission, or statement was given voluntarily.6 On the other hand, there is authority that only a preponderance of the evidence standard must be satisfied in determining whether a juvenile's confession is voluntary.7"