LibGuides: Verde, Brandon: Law Review Journal

Florida Bar Journal

Reasonable suspicion is also referred to as founded suspicion, which this court has described . . . as . . . something less than probable cause, but something more than a mere suspicion. It is a reasonable suspicionthat requires further investigation. City of Palm Bay, 475 So. 2d at 1326.

Florida Bar Journal

TIME IS OF THE ES‘SCENTS'

The Fourth Amendment, Canine Olfaction, and Vehicle Stops

A vehicle stop predicated on reasonable suspicion that a violation of criminal law has occurred-or a vehicle stop predicated on probable cause that a noncriminal traffic offense has occurred if the stop produces reasonable suspicion of criminal activity-will terminate if and when the investigation dispels the officer's suspicions, unless the suspected motorist consents to the investigation's continuation. Craig Scheiner, Time Is of the Es'scents' the Fourth Amendment, Canine Olfaction, and Vehicle Stops, Fla. B.J., MARCH 2002, at 26, 30.

Any discussion of the intersection between the Fourth Amendment and motor vehicles should begin with an acknowledgment of the principle that law enforcement officers are authorized to seize a vehicle when there is probable cause to believe there is a violation of either a noncriminal traffic law or criminal law (traffic-related or not). Moreover, in compliance with the Terry doctrine, police officers are permitted to stop motor vehicles in the absence of probable cause if the officers are equipped with a reasonable suspicion of criminal activity. If reasonable suspicion of criminal activity is established, a motorist originally stopped for a traffic infraction may be detained for a longer period of time, provided the scope of the investigative detention is circumscribed by the purpose justifying the detention. Craig Scheiner, Time Is of the Es'scents' the Fourth Amendment, Canine Olfaction, and Vehicle Stops, Fla. B.J., MARCH 2002, at 26, 30.

Florida Bar Journal

“ARGUABLE PROBABLE CAUSE”: AN UNWARRANTED APPROACH TO QUALIFIED IMMUNITY

Through defining probable cause in objective terms, the elements of reasonableness inherent in the “probable cause” standard afforded such protection, e.g., by affording protection to an officer who acts with probable cause even if his suspect is innocent. Tal J. Lifshitz, "Arguable Probable Cause": An Unwarranted Approach to Qualified Immunity, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 1159, 1175 (2011)

[P]robable cause means “facts and circumstances within the officer's knowledge that are sufficient to warrant a prudent person, or one of reasonable caution, in believing, in the circumstances shown, that the suspect has committed, is committing, or is about to commit an offense.” As Justice Rutledge noted in Brinegar v. United States, the name “probable cause” itself implies that the standard deals in probabilities rather than technicalities; and these probabilities are “the factual and practical considerations of everyday life on which reasonable and prudent men, not legal technicians, act.”. Tal J. Lifshitz, "Arguable Probable Cause": An Unwarranted Approach to Qualified Immunity, 65 U. Miami L. Rev. 1159, 1174 (2011)