Initially, anyone who was "aggrived by an unlawful seacrch or seizure could utilize the exclusionary rule. "In order to qualify as a person aggrived by an unlawful search and seizure one must have been a victim of a search or seizure, one against whom the search was directed, as distinguished from one who claims prejudice only through the use of evidence gathered as a consequence of a search or seizure directed at someone else. Jones v. United States, 362 U.S. 257, 260 (1960) The court further stated that anyone legitimately on premises where a search occurs could challanges the procedure through a motion to suppress when the produces evidence that could be used against him or her. Id. at 261.
However, this approach was fundimentally changed in a subsequent case. In Rakas v. Illinois, 439 U.S. 128 (1978) the court again examined who has standing to utilize the Exclusionary Rule. In that case, the police stopped a car that fit the description of a used to flee the scene of a robbery. A search of the car yielded a shotgun and ammo used in the robbery. A motion to suppress was brought by the passangers of the car who did not own said car, and was subsequently denied by the trial court for lack of standing. The issue in the case was essentially whether "standing can be established absent ownership of the property seized." The court, in a 5-4 decision, stated that only those whose constitutional rights were violated may use the exclusionary rule. Basically, the court stated a person cannot use the rule merely because they were aggrieved" by an illegal search, they must show a violation of their constitutional right.s ( cite chemerinsky/ levenson). In this decision, the court focused on an a person had a reasonable expectation of privacy.
However, the Rakas decision still left the door open to other questions such as can a passanger in a car ever raise the exclusionary rule, and may a visitor to a house ever utilize the exclusionary rule? These questions were answered in subsequent cases. The court first examined when visitors in a person's home can raise the excusionary rule in Minnesota v. Carter, 525 U.S. 83 (1998). In that case, an officer walked by the window of an apartment and saw people inside bagging up a white powder. The officer notified headquarters and saw two of the men leave in a car. The car was subsequently pulled over where a pouch containing 47 grams of cocaine and a gun were found. After that arrest police returend to the appartemtnt and arrested and arrested the occupant. A search was conducted and other evidence in connection to the bagging of cocaine were found. The record revealed that the two men arrested in the car were from Chicago and the sole purpose to Minnesota was the bagging of cocaine. Additionally, the two men were only in the appartement for 21 1/2 hours. The court first points out that the basis for the analysis is whether someone has a reasonable expectation of privacy in the home of another. The court then points out that an overnight guest have a reasonable expectation of privacy that is protected by the 4th Amendment. The court states that the occupants of the car were not overnight guests, but were only on the premises for a business transaction, and therefore classified the premises as commercial. The court held that while an overnight guest has a reasonable expectation of privacy, someone on a property for purely commercial purposes. While commercial properties have privacy interests vested in them, it is much less so then a residental home, and therefore held that the search did not violate the 4th Amendment. It is also key to out that a person can obtain a reasonable expectation of privacy merely by a host's invitation. A home owner and a guest, even a short term guest, share a privacy interest in not having their possessions disturbed. This makes the commercial/residential distinction made in Carter even more important and pronounced.
A case considering whether passangers in a car Brendlin v. California, 127 S. Ct. 2400 (2007). Basically, the court has long held that when a police officer makes a traffic stop, the driver is seized within the meaning of the 4th Amendment. However, the question of this case is whether the same is true of passangers in the stopped car, and if so, can those passangers avail themselves to the exclusionary rule. The case involved a car that was stopped by a deputy Sheriff in late November 2001. The officer ordered the passanger out of the car because he thought he may be a parole violator. After confirming that the defendant/passanger was a parole violator he placed him under arrest and searched the car. Inside the car, drugs and drug paraphernalia were found and confiscated. The defendant was charged with possession and manufacture of drugs. The state admitted that the initial stop was baseless, and the defendant moved to suppress the evidence in connection with the traffic stop. The defendant's motion to suppress did not challange the search conducted, but the lawfullness of the initial seizure. The court begins by stating the well established standards of what is a seizure, which is whether a reasonable person would feel free to decline the officers' requests and otherwise terminate the encounter." The court then focused on the fact that there was no adequate justification to pull the car over and state a "traffic stop necessarily curtails the travel a passanger has chosen just as much as it halts the driver, diverting both from the stream of traffic to the side of the road, and the police activity that normally amounts to intrusion on privacy and personal security does not distinguish between passenger and driver." They held that the passenger will feel subject to the will of the officer and attempting to leave the area will likely not be allowed by the officer conducting the stop. Therefore, a passanger is seized within the meaning of the 4th Amendment and therefore has sufficient standing to suppress evidence via the exclusionary rule.
The Exclusionary Rule is a punishment that seeks to deter the government from violating the 4th, 5th or 6th amendments. Basically, the Exclusionary Rule is "a judicially created remedy designed to safeguard Fourth Amendment rights through its deterrence effect." United States v. Calandra, 428 U.S. 465 (1976). This rule is a creature of the court and therefore in order to understand what it means and how it functions, an indebebth and substantial case analysis is necessary. It is important to note that this rule has not been around since the creation of the republic, but rather was created in the early part of the 20th centurary.
The two most important cases that established the Exclusionary Rule as a safeguard of Fourth Amendment Rights are Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 382 (1914), and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 634 (1961).
Weeks
In Weeks, the court considered the constitutionality of a search that yielded evidence illicit gambling activity being conducted in various states. Id at . The Search was conducted without a warrant or consent of the accused. Id. at 386. Additionally, after the first search, the officers returned with a Marshal and again searched the home of the accused without a warrant, finding more evidence that was used against him in court. Id. After a trial, the defendant was convicted of conducting a lottery though the mail, in violation of federal law. Id. Mr. Weeks, the accused, requested, through petition, the return of "private papers, books and other property" that was taken from his home on the date of the search. Id. at 387. According to the court, "the question presented involves the determination of the duty of the court with reference to the motion may be the defendant for the return of certain letters, as well as other papers, taken from his room by the United States marshal, who, without authority of process, if any such could have been legally issued, visited the room of the defendant or the declared purpose of obtaining additional testimony to support the charge against the accused, and, having gained admission to the house, took from the drawer of the chiffonier there found certain letters written to the defendant, tending to show his guilt." Id. at 389. Or in other words, whether the search of the accused home violated the 4th Amendment, and if so how the court should dealt with such a violation.
The court began it's reasoning by stating a familiar maxim of common law, that a man's home is "his castle," and the constitution, though the 4th Amendment recognizes that principal. Id. at 390. The court stated, "with this guaranty of the right of the people to be secure in their papers against unreasonable searches and seizures such matter could only be opened and examined upon warrants issued on oath or affirmation particularly describing the thing to be seized, 'as is required when papers are subjected to search in one's own household.'" Id. at 391. The court states that the government obtaining criminal convictions by way of illegal searches, warrantless searches, and forced confessions could not stand constitutionally and further stated that citizens of the republic have a fundamental right to challenge these unlawful procedures under the 4th Amendment to the Constitution. Id. at 392. The court therefore concluded that when a person acting on behalf of the United States, "under the color of his office," violates the constitutional rights of a defendant on grounds such as these, the evidence should be excluded from trial. Id. at 398.The court further states that not having such a rule would essentially render the 4th Amendment to the constitution meaningless. Id. In closing the court made sure to point out that the 4th Amendment does not apply to everyone, but rather only the Federal Government. Id.
It Is very important to note that the decision that was rendered in Weeks did not apply the Exclusionary Rule to the states, but only to the federal government. In Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25 (1949), the court considered whether to apply the Exclusionary Rule to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The Wolf Court stated that while the 4th Amendment is incorporated by the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment and therefore applicable to the states, Id at 28. the Exclusionary Rule is not incorporated or applicable to the states. Id. Additionally, the Wolf court recognized that implicit in the 4th Amendment exists a right to privacy. To be exact, the court held, "that in a prosecution in a State court for a State crime the Fourteenth Amendment does not forbid the admission of evidence obtained by an unreasonable search and seizure." Id. According to some, the courts unwillingness to extend the Exclusionary Rule to the states can be explained by a major debate that was occurring at that time, the incorporation debate. At issue in this debate was whether the bill of rights should be applied to the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment or not, and if so what parts should or should not be incorporated. (Citation to Chemerinsky & Levenson needed). However, this view of the Exclusionary Rule changed in the early 1960's when the court decided the case of Mapp v. Ohio 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
Mapp
In Mapp, the court examined a case where the police in the state of Ohio sought evidence in relation to a bomber at the house of the accused. Id at 644. The police first sought to enter the home of the accused who denied them access and was described as belligerent. After being denied upon their first visit, they later returned with what appeared to be a warrant and forced their way into the accused's home. While there a search was of the home was conducted and the officers found materials illicit materials. Id at 645. Subsequently, the accused was convicted of possession of these illicit martials. Id. At trial there was no reference to the items or be seized or the place to be searched, in fact, there was no reference to a warrant at all. Id. The State based their argument on Wolf v. Colorado (supra), and contended that even if the evidence was obtained in an unconstitutional manner, there was no prohibition against its introduction at trial. Id. The court again examined whether the Exclusionary Rule was applicable to the states through the Due Process clause contained in the 14th Amendment. The court began by noting that the decision in Weeks (supra) was not a mere rule of evidence, but was a constitutional decision, and has substantive value. The court stated that implicit in the 4th Amendment is a right to privacy, and that right to privacy is enforceable against the states through the Due Process Clause of the 14th Amendment. The court further held, "in extending the substantive protections of the due process clause to all constitutionally unreasonable searches - state or federal - it was logically and constitutionally necessary that the exclusion doctrine - an essential ingredient of the right to privacy - be also insisted upon as an essential ingredient of the right newly recognized by the Wolf case." The court also found that whenever the Fourth and Fifth Amendments of the constitution would have been violated if the case was a federal case, the 14th Amendment Due Process Clause would also be violated.
Miranda
In Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966), the Supreme Court consolidated multiple cases in order to strike at the heart of important issues concerning the 5th Amendment right against self-incrimination. The court framed the issue in the following way; "The constitutional issue we decide in each of these cases is the admissibility of statements obtained from a defendant questioned while in custody or otherwise deprived of his freedom of action in any significant way. Id. at 445. The Court Concluded that "without proper safeguards the process of in-custody interrogation of persons suspected or accused of crime contains inherently compelling pressures which work to undermine the individual's will to resist and to compel him to speak where he would not otherwise do so freely." Id. at 467. The court held that unless and until the now familiar "Miranda Warnings" are issued and waived, :no evidence obtained as a result of interrogation can be used against [the defendant]" Id. at 479, A statement that means the exclusionary rule will apply to statements solicited in violation of the Miranda warnings.
Massiah
Yet another important case for understanding the application of the Exclusionary Rule is Massiah v. United States, 377 U.S. 201 (1964). This case stands for the proposition that the 6th Amendment right to counsel applies to all criminal defendants once formal proceedings are commenced against them. Once this occurs, the government may not communicate with the defendant without counsel being present. Any communication that gives the government evidence that they will attempt to use against the defendant at trial is suppressible on 6th Amendment grounds.
In sum, the exclusionary rule was created in order to deter the government from violating it's citizens 4th, 5th, and sometimes 6th Amendment rights. Weeks created the rule and applied it to federal courts. Despite it's failure to be incorporated in Wolf, it was later incroporated in Mapps. Miranda established that violations of the 5th Amendments would have the exclusionary rule applied if the police do not issue Miranda Warnings.
There are 5 important exceptions to the Exclusionary Rule that will be examined and explained in turn.
1. The Exclusionary Rule does not apply to knock and announce
The Supreme Court has long required police, absent exigent circumstances, to knock on the door of a home and announce their presence to its inhabitance before searching a home. However, in Hudson v. Michigan, 126 S. ct. 2159 (2006), Justice Scalia delivered a majority opinion that held a violation of the "knock and announce" rule alone would not be sufficient to suppress evidence based on the exclusionary rule. The court also stated that there would be other alternatives, such as civil suits, to a punish violation of "knock and announce." The court weighed the societal interest in prosecuting criminals against the interest of citizens being protected by the knock and announce rule and concluded the former outweighed the latter.
2. The Independent Source Exception
This is an exception to the Exclusionary Rule created by Segura v. United States, 468 U.S. 776 (1984), and further explained in Murray v. United States, 487, U.S. 533 (1988). These cases created an exception to shield to protect the government from use of the exclusionary rule when there is evidence that is obtained illegally, that is later also obtained from a constitutional source independent of the illegal activity. For example, Murray v. United States, the accused was under surveillance by federal agents, who believed him to be storing a large quantity of drugs. The federal agents forced entry into a warehouse where they believed the drugs were being stored and found a large quantity of marijuana, the agents left and kept watch on the warehouse until a warrant was obtained. The evidence presented to the judge who issued the warrant did not include testimony of the agents who had seen the large amount of drugs in the warehouse. The knowledge of the drugs was obtained at the time of the search, however, it was also obtained pursuant to the legal search and therefore, the exclusionary rule did not apply.
3. Inevitable Discovery
"If the police can demonstrate that they inevitably would have discovered the evidence, even without a violation of the 4th Amendment, the exclusionary rule does not apply and the evidence is admissible." (Chemerinsky, Levenson citation needed). A key case to understanding this exception is Nix v. Williams, 467 U.S. 431 (1984). In this case, a 10 year old girl and her parents went to a YMCA on Christmas Eve to attend a game where the young girl subsequently disappeared. Id at 435. The defendant was seen leaving the YMCA carrying a large bundle and was helped by a boy who saw two skinny white legs sticking out of the bundle. Id. The defendants car was found 160 miles east along with articles of the girls clothing. Id. A warrant for the arrest of the defendant was issued subsequently. The police believed that the body was left somewhere between the YMCA and where the car was found and a large scale search was conducted. Over 200 volunteers divided into teams and began to search the area covering several miles north and south of where the car was found. Id. at 436. While the search was being conducted, the defendent surrendered to local police in a jurisdiction other than where the crime had taken place. Id. While under arrest Williams contacted an attorney who arranged for the defendent to be taken from the area in which he surrendered to the area where the crime occurred; part of this arrangement was that the defendent was not to be questioned. Id. During the drive, a detective said the following: "I want to give you smething to think about... They are predicting snow... and I feel that you yourself are the only person that knows where this little girl's body is... and if you get a snow on top of it you yourself may be unable to find it. And since we will be going right past the area... I feel we could locate the body... the parents of this little girl should be entitled to a Christian burial for [her]... After a snow stom [we may not be] able to find it... I do not want you to answer me, just think about it" Id. Subsequently, the defendent led the officers to the ditch where he left the body, only 2 1/2 miles from where the search was currently being conducted. Id at 437. The court held that the inevitable discovery rule applied and stated that the prosecution must establish, by preponderance of the evidence that the evidence would have ultimately been found. Id. at 444 It stated that because the search was so close to where the body actually was, the body was likely to be found. Id.
4. Inadequate Causl Connection
When an arrest leads to a search or confession that provides evidence to the government generally that evidence will not be admissible if there was illegal government action as defined by the constitution. However, when the connection between the illegal state action and is attenuated to the point where the taint of the evidence is disputed, the exclusionary rule will generally not apply. A good example of this rule can be found in Wong Sun v. United States, 371 U.S. 471 (1963). In this case, police illegally broke into the defendants laundry which was located near his home. While being arrested, incriminating statement were made, however, the police failed to advise him of his Miranda rights. Id. at 474. The defendant was released without being charged and later questioned again, this time the officer did advise the defendant of his Miranda rights and the defendant again made incriminating statements. Id at 475. The court find that the pre-arrest statements were to be excluded as the fruit of an unlawful arrest, however the later statements were admissible because the connection between the unlawful arrest and the later questioning "became so attenuated as to dissipate the taint." Id. at 487.
5. The Good Faith Exception
Before one can begin an examination of this exception, it is useful to remember that the Exclusionary Rule is supposed to be a deterrent upon state actors. For this reason, if the police reasonably rely on an invalid warrant to conduct a search or seizure, the exclusionary rule will not be triggered. The case that created this exception is United States v. Leon, 486 U.S. 897 (1984). In this case, a warrant was obtained to search the home of the defendant, however, the warrant was deficient and the defendant sought to suppress the evidence found in his home (drugs). The court began by pointing out the purpose of the exclusionary rule is to have a deterring effect on the government, and that it is not explicitly mentioned in the Constitution. Id. at 906. The court stated that the exclusionary rule should only apply where "to those areas where its remedial objectives are thought most efficaciously served." The court further stated that the rule "cannot be expected, and should not be applied, to deter objectively reasonable law enforcement activity. In short, where the officer's conduct is objectively reasonable, excluding the evidence will not further the ends of the exclusionary rule in any appreciable way; for it is painfully apparent that... the officer is acting as a reasonable officer would and should act in similar circumstances. Excluding the evidence can in no way affect his future conduct unless it is to make him less willing to do his duty." As one can see, the court focuses in on the purpose for the rule, deterrence, and in light of that purpose renders a very controversial decision. This rule has been recently expanded in Herring v. United States, 555 U.S. 135, 144 (2009) where the court held that "To trigger the exclusionary rule, police conduct must be sufficiently deliberate that exclusion can meaningfully deter it, and sufficiently culpable that such deterrence is worth the price paid by the justice system. As laid out in our cases, the exclusionary rule serves to deter deliberate, reckless, or grossly negligent conduct, or in some circumstances recurring or systemic negligence. The error in this case does not rise to that level."
The exclusionary rule and the Fruit of the Poisonous Tree doctrine does not apply to private actors! In order for this rule to apply there must be some government action or a private citizen acting at the direction of the government!!
